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Abstract 
This paper examines recent theoretical and empirical developments on fiscal policy to 
conclude that it is an effective macroeconomic tool in terms of curing unemployment. It is 
further shown that financial stability, ignored prior to the ‘great recession’, is important in 
economic policy. Fiscal policy can contribute to curing unemployment, especially so when 
coordinated closely not only with monetary policy but also with financial stability policies. 
We also suggest that such coordination should be geared towards reducing income inequality. 
It is then high time that economists and economic-policy makers turned their attention more 
closely and seriously to restoring faith in fiscal policy with its strong macroeconomic role as 
a means of curing unemployment. Fiscal policy, properly coordinated with monetary and 
financial stability policies, should thereby be restored to its proper upgraded role in terms of 
economic policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to argue that fiscal policy can cure unemployment, which is 
linked to aggregate demand. When aggregate demand falls short of the economy’s ability to 
supply goods and services, unemployment rises. As the aggregate demand increases 
unemployment is reduced. Governments can stimulate aggregate demand when it is too weak 
and can restrain it when it is too strong. In this process fiscal policy influences positively 
output and income, reduces inequality, improves human capital, and has immeasurable social 
benefits. Such role and benefits, however, can better be achieved if there is proper 
coordination between fiscal policy, monetary and financial stability policies.
1
 Interestingly 
enough, the ‘great recession’ has highlighted not only the importance of fiscal policy but also 
that of financial stability. Both had been downgraded prior to the ‘great recession’. In terms 
of financial stability the belief in the efficiency of financial markets prevented a realistic and 
necessary approach to it by the supporters of the New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) 
framework; as a result systemic risk, financial regulation and supervision were significantly 
downgraded (see, for example, Arestis, 2011, 2012; Arestis and Karakitsos, 2013, for more 
details). The focus of this contribution is on the strong potential of fiscal policy to cure 
                                                 
1
 This contribution draws on Arestis (2012) but it goes further in its focus in that it is concerned with the 
influence of fiscal policy on unemployment via its impact on aggregate demand. It also accounts for more recent 
and further contributions than the Arestis (op. cit.) study. 
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unemployment, which is enhanced when coordinated with monetary and financial stability 
policies.  
 
We proceed after this short introduction with theoretical developments on the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy, which are discussed in section 2. Empirical developments on fiscal policy are 
examined in section 3, where the strong role of fiscal policy and its coordinated role with 
monetary policy are discussed. Further policy coordination aspects, namely financial stability 
and policies to reduce income inequality, are discussed in section 4. A final section 5 
summarises and concludes.    
 
2. Fiscal Policy Can Cure Unemployment: Theoretical Propositions 
 
Recent theoretical developments on fiscal policy reinstate its positive dimension, which had 
been downgraded by the proponents of the New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) 
paradigm. Auerbach et al. (2010) suggest that “This array of arguments against activist fiscal 
policy clearly met its match during the Great Recession  ..... But it is not accurate to say that 
activist fiscal policy was totally discredited or unpractised in the period just before” (p. 143). 
Especially so, when relaxing the ‘unrealistic’ assumptions of the theoretical model of the 
NCM. The assumptions just referred to relate to the Ricardian economic agents who are those 
that behave in an optimizing, fully forward manner, by trading in asset and other markets and 
are, thus, able to smooth consumption over time. Non-Ricardian economic agents follow non-
optimizing simple rules of thumb (they do not optimize intertemporally or intratemporally), 
cannot and do not participate in asset markets, and they merely consume their net-of-tax 
disposable income. There is actually empirical evidence that supports the contention that a 
significant proportion of consumers and firms are actually non-Ricardian in that they are not 
forward-looking or their behaviour is constrained (Coenen et al., 2012). The presence of non-
Ricardian households is crucial in that fiscal policy is effective under these circumstances, 
even under the remit of the NCM theoretical framework (Coenen and Straub, 2005). 
 
Such changes produce favourable results for fiscal policy in terms of its ability to cure 
unemployment. Blinder (2006) refers to a number of such assumptions of the NCM. These 
are long-time horizons, perfect foresight, rational expectations, perfect capital markets, and 
the absence of liquidity constraints. Removing such unrealistic assumptions does reaffirm the 
positive role of fiscal policy in curing unemployment. In terms of the assumption of liquidity-
unconstrained households and firms the evidence is clear. Even in developed countries up to 
a third of households do not have sufficient access to financial markets. Liquidity-constrained 
households and firms is thereby a great deal more realistic assumption and fully supported by 
the available evidence (Botman and Kumar, 2006). The assumption of overlapping 
generations is another ‘unrealistic’ assumption, relaxation of which produces a short-planning 
horizon by households implying that intertemporal smoothing of consumption is not possible 
(see, for example, Botman and Kumar, op. cit.). The study by Anderson, Hunt and Snudden 
(2013) is very relevant in terms of this argument. It uses a multicounty Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model (the IMF Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model, 
GIMF, which is described in Anderson et al., 2013), and drops some of these assumptions. 
More specifically, it assumes instead, liquidity-constrained households along with finite 
planning horizons of households (assumptions that are not adopted for the purposes of the 
3 
 
   
NCM theoretical framework). In utilising these assumptions this study produces interesting 
empirical results in that it demonstrate clearly that fiscal and monetary policies have an 
important role to play in economic policy. The study by Coenen et el. (2012) is also relevant 
in this regard. This is based on the argument that “rather than assuming that all households 
are Ricardian ‘permanent income’ consumers”, it should be stated that “a significant fraction 
of households is liquidity-constrained, or follows rule-of-thump behaviour” (p. 24). This is 
very supportive of fiscal policy as a stabilization instrument. Ramey (2011) offers an 
interesting brief review of “the leading theories on the effects of government spending” (p. 
674) to conclude that “the theoretical work on government spending gives a wide range of 
possible values of the multiplier, depending on the type of model used, the assumptions about 
how monetary policy behaves, the type and persistence of government spending, and how it 
is financed” (p. 676). It is, therefore, suggested that “It is necessary ... to turn to the data to 
see if we can narrow the range” (p. 676). As stated below the empirical evidence reported in 
the Ramey (op. cit.) study provides a range of multipliers between 0.8 and 1.5. 
 
A recent development that downgrades fiscal policy is that of fiscal austerity. It is argued that 
fiscal austerity is an important strategy to restore growth and employment. The argument is 
based on the proposition that reducing government deficit and public debt produce lower 
interest rates than otherwise, inject confidence in the private sector and thereby encourage 
more investment and consumption. The interesting question is why in a depressed economy 
investment and consumption would expand. Is it not the case that fiscal austerity leads to a 
short-run reduction in output and employment, which is often associated with a decline in the 
wage share and lower consumption. This produces an increase in income inequality, given 
the relatively high share of wages in the incomes of lower-income groups. The duration and 
magnitude of these effects depend on the size of automatic stabilizers, as well as the growth 
response and its impact on employment. If multipliers are especially high during downturns, 
fiscal contraction can have a strong effect on employment. The interesting question is where 
demand would emerge under such circumstances. Clearly countercyclical fiscal policy is the 
only option. One might refer to a relevant recent study to make the point. Baum et al. (2012) 
have shown that fiscal stimulus is more effective and austerity more disastrous during 
recessions than during output upswings. Fiscal austerity does not seem to have any theoretical 
or empirical backing. 
 
These contributions relate to closed economies. The case of open economies should be, and 
has been, accounted for and interesting results emerge. Clearly, in the open economy case, 
trade balance and exchange rate changes could affect the value of the fiscal multiplier, in 
view of the leakages involved; the openness of the economy may very well lower multipliers. 
The size of the leakage would depend crucially on a number of factors that relate to the 
openness of the economy. Coenen et al. (2012) refer to the cases of the US and Europe to 
show that fiscal multipliers in the US are larger than in Europe, simply because the latter is a 
more open economy with larger leakages to imports. Although the reported open economy 
multipliers are weaker than in the case of a closed economy, they are certainly not negative. It 
is the case then that open economy multipliers favour fiscal policy (Gravelle and Hungerford, 
2011).  
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We next turn to the proposition that fiscal policy should not be implemented in isolation to 
monetary policy. Fiscal policy should be properly co-ordinated with monetary policy. 
Monetary policy reaction can play a key role in terms of the effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
When monetary and fiscal policies are consistent so that their impact on aggregate demand is 
cumulative, and not offsetting, the overall impact is higher than otherwise. Linnemann and 
Schabert (2003) utilize a model of wage and price stickiness to demonstrate that fiscal policy 
can affect output significantly if the monetary authority does not react aggressively to output 
changes. 
 
 Eggertsson (2006) suggests a concrete channel of fiscal expansion under coordination with 
monetary policy (see, also, Eggertsson, 2009). Fiscal expansion enhances expectations about 
future inflation, and, provided the central bank collaborates with the fiscal authority, the real 
rate of interest is reduced, which stimulates spending. It is important, though, in this 
approach, for the monetary authority to trade off some inflation for lower unemployment. 
Under such possibility a fiscal stimulus that increases inflationary pressures and a monetary 
authority that keeps constant the nominal interest rate, produces a lower real interest rate, 
thereby giving rise to further increases in consumption and investment expenditures. Also, a 
lower real interest rate causes the real exchange rate to depreciate, which can play a role in 
stimulating aggregate demand.
2
 
 
3. Fiscal Policy Can Cure Unemployment: Empirical Verification  
 
3.1 Empirical Evidence without Coordination  
 
 A number of empirical studies advocate renewed emphasis on fiscal policy as a key 
economic tool in macroeconomic stabilization. Romer and Romer (2010) is an example 
where a multiplier of roughly 3 is found for the US after three years of the fiscal change. Two 
recent IMF studies are also favourable to fiscal policy. The first (IMF, 2012b)  suggests that 
“In the current recessionary context, the negative impact of fiscal adjustment on activity can 
be expected to be large, as confirmed by new work on the size of fiscal multipliers during 
periods of weak economic activity” (p. ix). The second study (Baunsgaard et al., 2012) 
concentrates on results produced and summarised by IMF (2012b) to argue that “fiscal 
multipliers ..... can for many reasons be expected now to be above the average multipliers 
identified in earlier studies (p. 15).
3
 Ramey (2011) offers a review of fiscal multipliers, based 
on US data and studies, and assesses the value of the multipliers as a result of a temporary, 
deficit-financed increase in government purchases, to conclude that the multiplier for this 
type of spending is probably between 0.8 and 1.5; it is also suggested that “Reasonable 
people can argue, however, that the data do not reject 0.5 or 2.0” (p. 673). Coenen et al. 
                                                 
2
 In the case of independent monetary and fiscal authorities, coordination of fiscal and monetary policy does not 
necessarily imply that the respective authorities need to lose their ‘independence’. This is possible so long as 
both fiscal and monetary authorities have a common objective - for example maximization of social welfare 
(Eggertsson, 2006). Under such arrangements, both authorities would have to agree on the variables to be 
included in the social welfare function and the nature of trade-offs between the objectives. 
3
 Another IMF study, Estevão and Samake (2013), reports empirical results on fiscal consolidation, utilizing 
annual data from 1972 to 2010. Although fiscal consolidation tends to have a positive effect in low income 
countries, the results of fiscal consolidation in the case of advanced and emerging market economies confirm 
that it hurts short- and medium-term output. 
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(2012) provide a summary of further studies on the same theme where significant fiscal 
policy multiplier effects are reported.  
Gravelle and Hungerford (2011) provide a summary of fiscal policy multipliers of a number 
of recent studies. They suggest the following: “multipliers of 1.0 to 2.5 for government 
spending and transfers to the states for infrastructure, and 0.7 to 1.8 for transfers to the states 
for other purposes ….. For direct transfers to individuals (who have low incomes) the 
multipliers were between 0.8 and 2.1. Payments to retirees (largely Social Security 
beneficiaries) were 0.3 to 1.0. For taxes, tax cuts for lower- and middle-income taxpayers ..... 
were 0.6 to 1.5, while the increase in the alternative minimum tax exemption for higher-
income individuals was 0.2 to 0.6. Business tax cuts, mostly of a cash flow nature, were 0.0 
to 0.4” (p. 6). Arestis and Sawyer (2012a), utilising the stock/flow consistency model as, for 
example, in Godley and Lavoie (2007)
4
 and estimated at the Levy Economics Institute of 
Bard College, report similar results. It should be noted, though, that the Arestis and Sawyer 
(2012a) reported multipliers are on the whole higher than the ones reported in Gravelle and 
Hungerford (2011).  
 
An IMF study (Baum et al., 2012) examines whether there is a difference in multipliers in 
expansions and contractions. This study examines this possibility in the case of six out of the 
G-7 economies to conclude that average fiscal multipliers are larger in contractions than in 
expansions. This result is more prominent in the case of spending multipliers with the 
revenue multipliers not as high. Auerbach et al. (2010) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2012) are studies that assess the effectiveness of fiscal policy, spawned by the Great 
Recession; they conclude that the size of fiscal multipliers differ in recessions and 
expansions. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (op. cit.), in particular, use regime-switching, 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR), models and control for expectations, to conclude 
that government expenditure multipliers differ between recessions and expansions. In the 
case of the US economy, the derived multipliers vary from 1 to 1.5 in recessions and 0 to 0.5 
in expansions.  Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that in studying the quantitative impact of 
fiscal policy, the Structural VAR (SVAR) approach is more appropriate than large-scale 
econometric models or reduced-form ones.
5
 Employing post-war US data along with SVAR, 
the authors conclude that government purchases and tax multipliers for consumption and 
output are anything between one third and unity. Perotti (2012) concludes that higher tax 
multipliers than the ones in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) are in order. Perotti (2012) also 
concludes that, in contrast to the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, there is no evidence of 
taxation anticipated effects.  
 
                                                 
4
 The conclusion of  Godley and Lavoie (2007), in terms of the impact of fiscal policy in their model, is that “if 
the fiscal stance is not set in the appropriate fashion – that is, at a well-defined level and growth rate – then full 
employment and low inflation will not be achieved in a sustainable way” (p. 213).  
5
 It should be noted, though, that the SVAR technique is not without its problems. As Auerbach et al. (2010) 
note: “a central concern with the structural vector autoregressive approach is the identification of policy shocks” 
(p. 149).  Auerbach et al. (op. cit., pp. 149-150) also suggest that the SVAR approach is limited in view of its 
reduced-form nature. Three reasons are cited: automatic stabilisers cannot be accounted for; the SVAR approach 
cannot distinguish between short-lived and long-lived policies; and the derived multipliers can only account for 
the effects of policy interventions under the economic conditions as in the sample.    
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The study by Gechert and Will (2012) employs Meta Regression analysis for 89 studies 
(published from 2007 onwards) and utilises data for the period 1992 to 2012 (thereby 
providing 749 observations in terms of multiplier values). The focus of this study is “to 
provide a systematic overview of the different approaches” in an attempt “to derive stylized 
facts and to separate structural form from method-specific effects” (p. 2). Although the 
authors agree with the contention that their method cannot provide “the true multiplier value” 
(p. 2), they are, nonetheless, in a position “to separate methodical distinctions among studies 
from structural distinctions of the fiscal policy settings these studies evaluate” (p. 2). Their 
conclusions are that their reported multipliers vary depending on the setting and method used. 
Even so, their derived multipliers are higher in the case of ‘government expenditure’ 
multipliers than the ‘tax and transfers’ ones; it should be noted, though, that these differences 
are not always significant. Another important result is that public investment portrays the 
strongest fiscal impulse. A further and very relevant result to our contribution is that the 
interest-rate reaction function is vital to the multiplier values. The latter are significantly 
higher when the monetary authorities accommodate fiscal policy or the zero-bound interest 
rate is in place. 
 
The contribution by Pennings and Ruiz (2013) examines whether a speed of fiscal adjustment 
affects the size of fiscal multipliers. More precisely, their concern is whether once fiscal 
consolidation has been decided, would the pace to achieve it can affect the size of the 
multiplier. This is an empirical contribution, which portrays three features: the interaction 
between speed and consolidation size; a new sample of multi-year consolidations is 
constructed; and a new index is developed that measures the speed of the consolidation 
episodes as identified by the data. The latter is undertaken for 17 advanced countries over the 
period 1978-2009. Larger consolidation episodes produce multipliers of around 0.9, while for 
fast consolidations the multiplier could be as high as 1.8. The main conclusion of this 
contribution is that the speed at which fiscal consolidations are undertaken is important with 
fast consolidations producing higher multipliers than gradual consolidations. Pennings and 
Ruiz (op. cit.) acknowledge, however, that “Constrained by a small size, we see our results as 
a first step towards disentangling the relationship between speed and the multiplier, rather 
than the final word on the subject” (p. 19). 
  
In‘t Velt (2003) focuses on the impact of fiscal consolidations in the core and periphery Euro 
Area (EA) countries over the period 2011-2013. Seven countries are examined separately 
(Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Ireland) with the remainder EA 
countries examined as one aggregate block. The European Commission QUEST model (Ratto 
et al, 2008) is utilised for this purpose. Crisis conditions are assumed “with a higher share of 
households that are liquidity constrained than in normal times – set to half as opposed to 0.3-
0.4 estimated over past periods – and interest rates constrained by their zero interest rate floor 
for the length of 4 years” (p. 1). The findings of this contribution suggest that “While average 
impact multipliers are in the range between ½ and 1, depending on the degree of openness, 
negative spillovers can add between 1½ and 2½ pps to the negative growth effects” (p. 18). It 
is also found that “Although the impact on current accounts is shown to be modest and it 
clearly cannot be a substitute for reforms in deficit countries, it would support growth in the 
core countries and spillovers to the periphery countries would ease their adjustment” (p. 18).  
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A recent IMF (2013) study, which looks at lessons from the recent crisis on the role of fiscal 
policy in advanced economies, concludes that “The crisis has provided evidence that fiscal 
policy is an appropriate countercyclical policy tool when monetary policy is constrained by 
the zero lower bound, the financial sector is weak, or the output gap is particularly large” (p. 
1). Clearly coordination of fiscal and monetary policies is of vital importance as we argue 
further below. Still fiscal policy without coordination does matter. However, this leads to the 
obvious question of whether, and the extent to which, the available empirical evidence 
supports the proposition that when fiscal policy is coordinated with monetary policy can 
better cure unemployment. We discuss this issue in sub-section 3.2. 
 
3.2 Empirical Evidence with Coordination 
  
The empirical evidence is very supportive of coordinating fiscal and monetary policies. 
Eggertsson (2006), utilizing a calibrated model not dissimilar in substance to the NCM, 
reaches the conclusion that under fiscal and monetary policy coordination fiscal multipliers 
are higher than in the case of no coordination; they are, indeed, bigger than those found in the 
traditional Keynesian literature. Two types of fiscal multipliers are reported in Eggertsson 
(op. cit.): a real spending multiplier, where government consumption is raised but holding the 
budget balanced; and a deficit multiplier, where deficit spending increases. These fiscal 
multipliers are derived under two scenarios: when fiscal and monetary policies are 
coordinated; and when there is no policy coordination.
6
 The fiscal policy multiplier under 
coordination is 3.4 in the case of the real spending multiplier, and 3.8 under the deficit 
spending multiplier. When no policy coordination is present, i.e. when the central bank is 
‘goal independent’, the real spending multiplier is unchanged, while the deficit spending 
multiplier is zero. Eggertsson (op. cit.) explains this important difference in fiscal multipliers, 
when coordination is present in relation to those where coordination is absent, by the 
expectations channel as discussed above in section 2.  
 
In another study Eggertsson (2011) utilises a two-state Markov-switching framework 
(designed for the econometric modelling of univariate and multiple time series subject to 
shifts in regime) to examine fiscal multipliers when monetary policy responds to the fiscal 
policy action, and when it does not as in the case of a zero lower bound. The conclusion is 
that fiscal multipliers are about five times higher at the zero lower bound than in the other 
more normal occasions. A relevant study by Woodford (2011) suggests that under conditions 
of 'zero-bound' nominal rate of interest, fiscal multipliers in excess of unity are possible. This 
could only happen when the task of monetary policy to fill the output gap generated by the 
falling real rate of interest, due to inflationary pressures, is undertaken by fiscal policy. Other, 
and some of them more recent, studies reach similar conclusions. For example, Christiano et 
al. (2011), Siesman and Watzka (2013)  and Woodford (2010) show that government 
spending multipliers can be very large at zero bound; also increasing government expenditure 
is welfare improving. Blanchard et al. (2010) argue for a better integration between fiscal and 
monetary policy. Interestingly enough, Correira et al. (2013) argue that when the zero lower 
                                                 
6
 A different type of coordination is suggested by Sly and Weber (2013). This is fiscal coordination amongst 
economies, which become more integrated thereby influencing the transmission of macroeconomic shocks 
between them. Such fiscal coordination increases business cycle comovement by a one-and-a-half times larger 
than the effect of trade linkages of the relevant nations. 
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bound on nominal interest rates is in place fiscal policy is the only alternative to provide 
stimulus in the economy. Employing a New Keynesian model, they argue for a tax policy, 
which can provide the stimulus. ‘Wasteful public spending’ they argue is an inefficient policy 
- but without justifying the inefficiency of such spending to stimulate the economy. 
 
A number of studies utilize Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models to deal 
with the question of fiscal and monetary policy coordination. DSGE models utilise a small 
number of equations, based on microeconomic theory with parameters from empirical 
estimates, which are calibrated to obtain their results. As such these models rely heavily on 
the modelling assumptions undertaken, which may not be valid (see, for example, Auerbach 
et al., 2010, p. 150). It is also the case that small changes in the assumed coefficients produce 
substantial changes in the estimated multipliers (Hall, 2009). Freedman et al. (2009), utilizing 
the IMF macroeconomic DSGE model, which includes non-Ricardian households, conclude 
that “the multipliers of a two-year fiscal stimulus package range from 1.3 for government 
investment to 0.2 for general transfers, with targeted transfers closer to the upper end of that 
range and tax cuts closer to the lower end. In the presence of monetary accommodation … 
multipliers are up to twice as large, as accommodation lowers real interest rates, which in 
turn has a positive effect on corporate balance sheets and therefore on the external finance 
premium” (p. 26). Davig and Leeper (2009), utilizing a DSGE model, reach similar 
conclusions. This study concentrates on the experience of the ‘great recession’ when fiscal 
and monetary policies were used jointly in an effort to stimulate aggregate demand. The usual 
DSGE assumptions are utilized, with government expenditure treated as an exogenous 
variable. The study clearly concludes that coordination of the two policies provides stronger 
results than otherwise.  Employing a number of structural DSGE models,
7
 Coenen et el. 
(2012) conclude that fiscal policy is most effective when monetary policy is accommodative; 
for “with monetary accommodation and nominal interest rates held constant, the increases in 
inflation give rise to decreases in real interest rates. As a result accommodative monetary 
policy complements the fiscal policy stimulus and intensifies its effects on real GDP” (p. 51). 
 
Clearly, then, when fiscal policy is coordinated with monetary policy, it is more effective as 
the recent empirical evidence as reviewed above suggests. 
 
4. Fiscal Policy Can Cure Unemployment: Further Policy Coordination Possibilities  
 
 The ‘great recession’ has highlighted the importance of financial stability, which had been 
ignored prior to it, mainly because of the firm belief and emphasis on the ‘efficient market 
hypothesis’ (EMH). The implication being that all unfettered markets clear continuously 
thereby making disequilibria, such as bubbles, highly unlikely (IMF, 2010b, 2012a). The 
belief in the efficiency of financial markets prevented a realistic and necessary approach to 
financial stability by both the supporters of the NCM framework and policymakers. As a 
result potential systemic risk was ignored and financial regulation, as well as supervision, 
was increasingly light-touch. Consequently, the role of financial stability and its policy 
                                                 
7
 The models utilized are those developed at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (two 
models), the European Central Bank, the IMF, the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and the Bank of Canada. 
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implications were downplayed significantly. However, the events leading to the ‘great 
recession’ testify to the important requirement of financial stability. The focus of financial 
stability should be on proper control of the financial sector so that it becomes socially and 
economically useful to the economy as a whole and to the productive economy in particular. 
Banks should serve the needs of their customers rather than provide short-term gains for 
shareholders and huge profits for themselves. Proposals that aim to ensure financial stability 
have been put forward and we have discussed these proposals in Arestis and Karakitsos 
(1013). As a result financial stability has attracted renewed interest and focus as an 
instrument of monetary policy (Arestis and Sawyer, 2012b). The IMF (2010a, 2010b) 
suggestion that financial stability in the form of both microprudential and macroprudential 
policies provides a definite and strong way forward (see, also, Arestis and Karakitsos, 2013, 
chapters 8 and 9). The same publications go further to suggest that if the current low interest 
rates were to produce excessive risk-taking or bubbles, these should be addressed through 
macro-prudential policies mainly and not only through interest rate policy measures. It is the 
case actually that only microprudential had been the basis of the regulatory framework prior 
to the ‘great recession’. The difficulty with only a microprudential framework is that since it 
attempts to tackle problems with individual institutions, the overall result could very well be 
a serious damage to the economy as a whole.  
It is, thus, paramount for a macroprudential to co-exist with a microprudential one. A number 
of writers have argued that the regulatory framework was problematic because of that 
deficiency and that macroprudential policies are thereby of enormous importance (see 
Hansen et al., 2011, and a number of additional references therein). Hansen et al. (op. cit.) 
summarise the argument very well: “A microprudential approach is one in which regulation 
is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual 
financial institutions. By contrast, a ‘macroprudential’ approach recognizes the importance of 
general equilibrium effects, and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole. In the 
aftermath of the crisis there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers 
that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction” (p. 3). 
Macroprudential is a ‘systemwide oversight’ approach, and as such it “would broaden the 
mandate of regulators and supervisors to encompass consideration of potential systemic risks 
and weaknesses as well” (Bernanke, 2008). In terms of the macroprudential tools, Hansen et 
al. (2011) discuss six sets of such tools: time-varying capital requirements; higher-quality 
capital; corrective action targeted at capital as opposed to capital ratios; contingent capital; 
regulation of debt maturity; and regulating the shadow banking system. They offer empirical 
evidence to conclude that macroprudential regulation is of paramount importance. The danger 
is that “given the intensity of competition in financial services, they will also drive a larger 
share of intermediation into the shadow banking realm” (Hansen et al., p. 25). Regulating this 
system, long overdue in our view, along with the rest of the financial system is the obvious 
conclusion, although this is “a complex task, and one that will require a variety of specific 
tools” (Hansen et al., p. 25). Still such regulation is of vital importance, however complex 
such a task might be.  
Angelini et al. (2012), utilising the DSGE model for the euro area, make the point that 
macroprudential policies interact with monetary policy in affecting asset prices and credit, 
thereby affecting the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The relationship between 
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the two policies, though, differs from country to country. The point that relates more closely 
to the main argument of this contribution is that macroprudential policy can improve 
macroeconomic stability, with the qualification that the results are negligible when the cycle 
relies on real supply shocks, but significant “in the presence of financial or sector specific 
shocks” (p. 26), along with the proposition that “lack of cooperation between a 
macroprudential authority and a central bank may actually generate conflicting policies, 
hence excessive volatility of the policy instruments (interest rates and capital requirements), 
without enhancing the stability of the key macroeconomic variables (output and the loans-to-
output ratio)” (p. 25). This leads Angelini et al. (op. cit.) to the conclusion that their “results 
suggest that the benefits of macroprudential policy depend on the shocks and on the degree of 
coordination with monetary policy” (p. 6); and that “Yet the interaction between the two has 
received surprisingly little attention” (p. 3). 
These suggested measures have highlighted the importance and requirement for financial 
stability policies and the need to establish relevant and appropriate polices. BIS (2011) also 
makes the point when it suggests that “we need a stability framework in which monetary, 
fiscal and prudential policy work together to build a robust and stable macroeconomic and 
financial system that will make the next crisis both less likely and less severe” (p. 3). Another 
study, which also provides estimates of the effects of all the fiscal, monetary and financial 
interventions undertaken by the US government over the period since the beginning of the 
great recession, is Blinder and Zandi (2010). Using the Moody’s Analytics model of the US 
economy,
8
 they estimate that in the absence of those programmes GDP and employment 
would have been lower by 11.5 percent and 8.5 percent respectively. They also produce 
estimates for the fiscal stimulus over the period, which amounts to an increase of GDP by 3.4 
percent in 2010, equivalent to the creation of 2.7 million jobs. The paper by Medina and 
Roldós (2014) utilises a standard small open-economy New Keynesian model with a financial 
sector that incorporates financial frictions (a model that is essentially an extension of the 
financial accelerator of Bernanke et al., 1999). The introduction of financial frictions 
magnifies the cyclical fluctuations of the real and financial variables, especially so asset 
prices and credit. The model is used to investigate interactions between monetary and 
macroprudential policies. Macroprudential policies emerged during the great recession in a 
number of emerging countries in the form of raising reserve requirements to manage capital 
flows and curb credit growth, along with raising interest rates, in view of the unconventional 
monetary policies by the major ‘reserve-currency-issuing’ countries. The relevant conclusion 
of the Medina and Roldós (op. cit.) paper in terms of the purposes of this section is that 
employment of a macroprudential instrument is important but more so it is the close 
coordination of both macroprudential, which purports to mitigate financial frictions, and 
monetary policy, i.e. interest rate that can mitigate a nominal friction, that are shown to be 
“useful guidelines for the conduct of monetary policy in the context of volatile capital flows” 
(p. 32).
9
  
                                                 
8
 For some details on the Moody’s Analytics model of the US economy see: 
http://www.economy.com/home/products/us-macro-model.asp 
9
 An interesting contribution that focuses on ‘Macroprudential Policies in a Global Perspective’ is the study by 
Jeanne (2014). It analyzes the case for international coordination of macroprudential policies with monetary 
policy in the context of a simple theoretical framework. The case of uncoordinated use of macroprudential 
policies can lead to a ‘capital war’, which can produce negative effects. The study’s model examines the case 
where one country (the US) is in a liquidity trap with unemployment, while the rest of the world, China in this 
11 
 
   
With the objective of financial stability, the Central Bank would become more like a Central 
Financial Agency (CFA). It would be responsible for policies, which seek to influence the 
credit and lending policies of the full range of financial institutions. Our current contribution 
in this context is to argue the case for full coordination of both monetary and financial 
stability policies with fiscal policy; such coordination is much more powerful in terms of the 
impact of fiscal policy on unemployment. We would go one step further and suggest that 
discretion is as important in applying them.  
  
As argued in Arestis (2012), but also in Hein and Truger (2011), and Van Treeck and Sturn 
(2012), such coordination should also include another policy objective of paramount 
importance; namely  cure socio-economic inequalities. This has become particularly relevant 
and important in policy making in view of the ‘great recession’; one might go a step further 
and suggest that inequality has become a most important challenge of the current century. 
Indeed, the main causes that had lead to the ‘great recession’ demonstrated vividly that 
distribution of income if not tackled can lead to crisis.  Distribution of income from wages to 
profits, especially to the top end, namely the financial sector, along with financial 
liberalisation and the financial architecture that followed was one of the main causes of the 
‘great recession’ (Arestis and Karakitsos, 2011; 2013; see, also, Palley, 2010). As also argued 
in Arestis and Sawyer (2011) accounting for ‘distributional effects’ in both economic theory 
and policy, which have been fatally ignored in the past, has become a very serious 
consideration. An IMF Discussion Note (Berg and Ostry, 2011) also supports the view that 
income inequality and economic growth are closely related. The emphasis in the latter 
contribution is that what is particularly critical is that improving income distribution increases 
the length of growth spells rather than merely getting growth to take place. Clearly, such 
policies would contribute significantly to curing unemployment. 
 
Another recent IMF contribution on income inequality (Ball et al., 2013) reaches similar 
conclusions. Fiscal consolidation produces significant, sizeable and persistent distributional 
effects. Ball et al. (op. cit.) employ ‘impulse response functions directly from local 
projections’ in a sample of 17 OECD countries, and using annual data for the period 1978-
2009, the authors conclude that fiscal consolidation raises inequality, decreases income 
shares and increases long-term unemployment significantly. Also government spending-
based programmes produce larger distributional effects than tax-based adjustments.
10
  Still 
another recent IMF paper (Woo et al., 2013) provides evidence on the effects of fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                        
sense, attempts to mitigate the effects of the US monetary stimulus by a prudential accumulation of reserves. A 
case for international coordination is proposed whereby both countries should be less aggressive in the pursuit 
of their objectives. It is also shown that “coordination is stronger in a bust when global resources are 
underutilized than in a boom” (p. 24).The study by Jeanne (op. cit.) adopts a view of macroprudential policy that 
is not restricted to banking regulation. In the case of the open economy macroprudential policy can be 
implemented through the management of international reserves. 
10
 Fiscal consolidation as constructed in the Ball et al. (2013) study is “based on a narrative approach and 
focuses on policy actions—tax hikes and/or spending cuts—taken by governments with the intent of reducing 
the budget deficit” (p. 4). This differs from the “fiscal consolidation measured by successful budget outcomes” 
(p. 4; highlight as in the original). This latter measure of fiscal consolidation utilizes the cyclical primary 
balance, which is adjusted for the estimated effects of business cycle fluctuations. This measure of fiscal 
consolidation is thought by Ball et al. (op. cit.) to be problematic. 
 
 
 
12 
 
   
consolidation on income inequality, for 17 OECD countries and for the period 1978-2009, 
using annual data. Econometric analysis for a panel of developed and emerging countries, 
along with twelve selected fiscal consolidation episodes, is utilised to conclude that fiscal 
consolidations raise inequality. Spending-based consolidations worsen significantly 
inequality relative to tax-based consolidations. Significant effects on unemployment are 
evident in this study; unemployment in its turn increases inequality, thereby providing an 
important channel through which consolidation increases inequality.  
  
Our proposal of coordination of fiscal policy with monetary and financial stability policies, 
along with a serious emphasis on reducing income inequality, affects the level of demand in 
the economy through a higher wage share and a lower profits share. Sawyer (2010) gives 
examples to illustrate the case: “if the wage share were say 5 percentage points higher, and 
there is a difference in the marginal propensity to consume between wages and profits of say 
0.3, then savings would be lower by 1.5 percent of GDP. A redistribution of income from the 
top two deciles to bottom four deciles of 10 percent of earnings – that is 6 to 7 per cent GDP, 
and the marginal propensity to consume difference of 0.2, a further 1.2 to 1.4 per cent; these 
two, rounded up to 3 per cent of GDP would solve much of the budget deficit problem. The 
shift from profits to wages in the first example would be the same order of magnitude (but in 
the opposite direction) as that observed in industrialised countries such as Germany over the 
past decade. The second example would amount similarly to the reversal of the inequality 
changes in the UK over the past three decades” (p. 42). These examples make the case for 
policies to tackle income distribution, which should be at the centre of the coordination of 
fiscal with monetary and financial stability policies as argued in this contribution. Such 
economic policies, with fiscal policy at the helm, influence aggregate demand and thereby 
unemployment.
11
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
  
We have argued in this paper that fiscal policy is an effective instrument of regulating the 
level of aggregate demand and thereby unemployment. We have examined this conclusion 
through both theoretical and empirical considerations to conclude that fiscal policy is a key 
component of any macroeconomic framework alongside monetary and financial policies. 
This conclusion is supported by a further suggestion, namely coordination of fiscal, monetary 
and financial stability policies. In doing so, the relevant authorities should employ a great 
deal of discretion in the application of this coordination.  
  
It is the case, then, from our analysis in this contribution, that fiscal policy can cure 
unemployment through its impact on aggregate demand. Furthermore, this role of fiscal 
policy is further enhanced if there is proper coordination between fiscal policy, monetary and 
financial stability policies. Interestingly enough, the ‘great recession’ has highlighted not 
only the importance of fiscal policy but also that of financial stability. Both had  been 
seriously downgraded  prior to the ‘great recession’. This contribution concludes that fiscal 
policy is a strong tool of economic policy in curing unemployment, especially so when 
                                                 
11
 A recent IMF (2014) study provides a list of fiscal policies that can produce ‘more efficient’ redistribution of 
income in both developed and developing countries. 
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coordinated with monetary and financial stability policies (see, also, BIS, 2011). 
Furthermore, and as our proposal of coordination of fiscal policy with monetary and financial 
stability policies suggests, it is also paramount that such coordination should be geared 
towards reducing income inequality. Such combination and focus of economic policies is 
very robust in terms of curing unemployment.   
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